My latest article, 'An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness' was just published in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion!
Abstract
It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true.
You can download the pre-print version here:
Joshua Matthan Brown, An epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness - PhilPapers
You can read the published version for free by clicking on the following link:
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