Published Articles
Abstract
It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article I grant, for the sake of argument, that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true.
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Book Reviews
“Review of Paul Copan with William Lane Craig (eds.) The Kalam Cosmological Arguments Vol. 1: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018),” in Religious Studies.
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